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IN THE SUPREME COURT !OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNETTE ELLERTSEN BELDEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALBO, INC., and DALE 
RANDOLPH PEEL, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
vs. 
MARTIN R. LINGWALL, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Appellant. 
qase No. 20054 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In December of 19 82, a f t e r a j u r y t r i a l be fo re t h e 
Honorable Homer F. Wi lk inson , i n t h e Thiird J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t 
Court of Summit County, S t a t e of Utah, r e sponden t Dalbo, I n c . , 
was awarded a judgment of $199,500.00 a g i i n s t a p p e l l a n t , 
Mar t in R. L ingwal l . T h e r e a f t e r , appellanjt f i l e d a Motion for 
Judgment No twi ths t and ing the Verd i c t or A l t e r n a t i v e l y fo r a 
New Trial, An Order was subsequently entered by the Court on 
June 7, 1984, denying said motion. It is from this Order that 
the appellant now appeals. 
For purposes of this appeal, Martin Lingwall will be 
referred to as plaintiff/appellant and Dalbo, Inc., will be 
referred to as defendant/respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant petitions this Court to reverse the 
District Court's denial of plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial 
and asks that this case be remanded for a new trial to be 
conducted in accordance with the opinion of this Court. 
FACTS 
On September 5, 19 81, an accident occurred on a road 
near Chalk Creek Canyon, Summit County, Utah. The accident 
involved a c o l l i s i o n between a t ruck and a motorcycle. The 
truck was owned by Dalbo, Inc. I t was driven by an employee 
of Dalbo, Dale Randolph Peel , in the course of h i s employment. 
The motorcycle was driven by Martin R. Lingwall with Annette 
Belden r id ing behind Mr. Lingwall as a passenger. 
This act ion was originally'commenced by Annette 
Belden as p l a i n t i f f against Dale Peel and Dalbo, Inc. The 
defendants, Dale Peel and Dalbo, I n c . , f i l e d a t h i r d - p a r t y 
complaint anainst t h i r d - p a r t y defendant Martin R. Lingwall 
claiming a r igh t to con t r ibu t ion . Third-par ty defendant 
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Martin R. Lingwall counterclaimed for damages against Dale 
Peel and Dalbo, Inc. The matters at issue between Annette 
Belden and Dale Peel and Dalbo, Inc., wlere settled out of 
court and a stipulation was entered intb by all parties and 
filed with the court prior to trial. 
Trial on the action commenced! November 30, 1982. 
During the proceeding and over the objection of plaintiff's 
counsel, the Court allowed testimony to be heard by the jury 
regarding Mr. Lingwall1s extra-marital relationship with 
Annette Belden. At the close of evidence the jury was given 
instruction and began its deliberations^ While trying to 
reach a verdict the jury became confused. It requested 
additional instruction regarding the effect of its finding 
of comparative negligence. The Court declined to give 
additional instruction and referred the jury to instructions 
already given. 
The jury returned the special verdict as -follows: 
1. At the time and place in question and 
under the conditions afe shown by the 
evidence were Dalbo, Ihc. and Dale 
Randolph Peel negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
2. Was such negligence th& proximate cause 
of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
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3. At the time and place in question and 
under the conditions as shown by the 
evidence, was Martin R. Lingwall negligent 
ANSWER: Yes. 
4. Was such negligence of Martin R, Lingwall 
the proximate cause of hiw own injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
5. If you have answered questions 2 and 4 
"Yes", then answer this question: 
Considering all the negligence that 
caused the accrdent at One Hundred Percent 
* (100%), what percentage of that negligence 
is attributable to: 
(a) Dalbo, Inc. and Dale R. Peel: 30% 
(b) Martin R. Lingwall: 70% 
(c) Total: 100% 
6. Set forth the amount of damages that you 
find Martin R. Lingwall has suffered as a 
result of the injuries received in the 
accident in question: 
Lost Income (present): $28,000.00 
Lost Income (future): 20,000.00 
Medical Expenses: 16,083,00 
General Damages: 5,000.00 
Total: $69,083.00 
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7. At the time the accident occurred was the 
road where :* -ocnrred: 
( a ) A 
(b) A p r i v a t e r o a d ? 
ANSWER: A p r i v a t e r o a d . 
Based rr. - h i s v e r d i c t , Mr IMn^wall r-a^ nn^-c- i -
 e d 
and '" r'lr +T": " \ _ "or 
«, or» L i"Lbut i o n . 
P l a i n t i f f then moved t h e D i s t r i c t Court for din, I;-men I" 
Not wi t h s i Hiding t h e Verdi n m in > T r i a] Both motions were 
d e n i e d . 
P l a i n t i f f r--T *- - * • • -. e . )m 
i Hv d e c i s i o n ut . S L L ' U . W . : . . . l a i m i n g as e r r c "di. 
f o l l o w i n g : 
1. E • , _ _:e ^ury as t o t h e 
c o n s e q u e n c e s of t:\ei- a p p o r t i o n m e n t ^f n e g l i g e n c e be tween 
t h e p a r t i e s . 
'-r-:-,... . . c i t i n g t o apply t h e h o l d i n g of 
Dixon v . S t e w a r t , b58 P ?d 591 (Utah ] ° 8 2 ) . d e c i d e d " h i l e t h i s 
C a s e . i - '• . : r * . ^ 1^1 . . 
i r r o , ^ a l l o w i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n s e l t o 
q u e s t i o n p l a i n t i f f a*" l e n g t h r e ^ a r d i n - h i s per.snn/il iv | , i f mn-
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. This case was tried within one month before the 
Utah Supreme Court decided Dixon v. Stewart, supra. Dixon 
held that upon request the trial court shall instruct the 
jury on the effect of their finding of comparative negligence. 
In the instant case, the trial court's refusal to 
instruct the jury on its finding of comparative negligence 
led to the same error as was found in Dixon, that being 
improper jury confusion resulting in an anomalous jury verdict*. 
The jury's confusion in this case and in Dixon is 
close to being identical. Based on the same reasoning as 
expressed in Dixon, this Court should remand this case to 
the District Court to be decided in accordance with the law, 
as expressed in Dixon. 
II. The District Court erred in denying appellant's 
motion for new trial. The District Court biased its decision 
on its refusal to give limited retroactive effect to Dixon v. 
Stewart, supra, a case decided by this Court while appellant's 
motion was pending before the lower court. Because the law 
changed before final judgment was entered in this case, 
appellant should have the benefit of the new rule. 
III. The District Court abused its discretion in 
admitting testimony concerning appellant's extra-marital 
relationship with Annette Belden. This evidence prejudiced 
appellant by allowing the jury to decide the issue of liability 
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b a s e d on appeLLan' : 1^ e t h i c a l r o n d u c " r a t h e ^ *-u i r • * 
: i ' . n ^ ' , 1'* t .-. jLj-^.-,t.J 1 -It, .} 1 L l iv - i ^ d - U t J - w L 
ARGUMENT 
* r in 1 t h i s " - '-e -.rd t : deternri ne 1:1: le compar-
a t i v e . . • . b e t w e e n p l a i n t , i f f M a r t i n L i n g w a l i . an ; 
d e f e n d a n t , DnJhc, I n c . , r e s p e c t i v e ! • a p p e l l a n t and res^«v s-nt 
A f t e r t h e c l o s e of e v i d e n c e t h e * ury was i n s t r u c t e d 
and s e q u e s t e r e d f~-r de l i b e r ' i t : -- •
 x,„ , i 
e ^ t i i . . -
 ; ... became coriiusew oi t e f f e c t t h e i r f i n i i n g 
:" c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e would h a ^ ^u trie ^av**: ^ 
a t t e m • _• _ foreman , , : L .-. * u ; 
renuesct-w * t r i a l c o u r r fo r a d c l t l m a l i n s t r u c t o r . 
C o u r t d e n i e d t h e r e q u e s t and r e f e r r e d fhe \\tv\ In insL I'm:! i.uns 
a l r eady g I veil. 
Tie A ur\ subseouen f l.y r e t u r n e d ? <;^r.->: , > v r • Ji r |-
findinv? *. * - -i^t?' -*.: ic i t / 0 
n e g i i g e r \n a d d i t i o n , Mr. L i n g w a l i was found t o have s u f f e r e d 
damage s r o t a i i n g 9 O J , 0 3 J . 0 J , a s urn inu c h I e s .s n i in i i»i i j:» j i j a 1 i y 
j) r a y e d fot . 
Based on t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t , t h e I r i a * r o u r t e n t e r e d 
j udgmen t in December 1 9 3'""" ""! •'"• ' ! ugwal 1 , was n o n - s u i t e d 
and o r d e r e d t o pay defendant : $199,500 00 :r. i t s c r o s s - c l a i m 
fo r c on. t r i b ut i on . 
In interviews with the jurors after t r i a l [See 
Affidavits, Appendix A], i t was revealed that (1) due to 
inadequate instruction the jury had, indeed, been confused 
because of the nature of the special verdict and the lack of 
knowledge as to what was actually being decided; and, (2) 
that the jury had intended to awrard Mr. Lingwall damages, but 
because of the Court's fai lure to give instruction of the 
effect of the ju ry ' s finding of comparative negligence, they 
were precluded from being able to properly determine the facts 
and submit a verdict that reflected the i r desired resu l t . 
Thereafter, plaintiff brought motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdicts and for a new trial. On motion 
for new trial, plaintiff listed as error the Court's failure 
to instruct the jury regarding their finding of comparative 
negligence. Plaintiff based his argument on Dixon v. Stewart, 
650 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), a Utah Supreme Court case decided 
while plaintiff's motion was pending before the District Court. 
Dixon involved a wrongful death suit brought by 
the family of a pedestrian struck and fatally injured by 
defendant driver. The jury found plaintiff's decedent 60% 
negligent and the driver of the car that fatally injured him 
407o negligent. On appeal to this Court, the plaintiff alleged 
error in the Trial Court's failure to instruct the jury as to 
the consequences of the apportionment of negligence between 
the parties. 
- 8 -
T
~ ':he Dixon d e c i s i o n \ ie Utah Supreme r 
t h a t s i m 1 • 9 **" •: r fv. ? : on r* ~<": 
r "Lound 
a; c a s e 
L d t r i c u CourL b<' i.ow 
r ' r i o r «-o Dixon . Urah 1 qw lie i d i t was " p r G i i k h V i . i l 
*. = o^ i j igence c a s e , t h e Court i n s t r u c t s 
t*hc j ui v ab ne e f f e c t or impac t i t s f a r r ^-'pr-ino mswers 
e r 
•J anr -ne^" '^l v e r d i c t 
J C U Jill 
case, 
?ower and Light Co., 52y I (Utah 19 75) 
:t- evidence aen onstrates 
negligence on the part of both parties, 
The verdict form shows that: the jury 
foreman originally entered the 407o-60% 
split in the opposite order, that is, 
he showed the plaintiff as 40% negligent 
and the defendant as 607o negligent. 
Subsequently, a line was drawn through 
those two figures and they were reversed. 
In addition, the amount entered as damages 
was very much reduced from, the amount 
prayed for by the plaintiffs, indicating 
a likelihood that the jurors thought they 
were awarding the plaintiffs an amount 
reduced by the percent 
negligence. 
j f *:he ir de ce dan t 
In overruling McGinn. r v i r r c'^c 1 -\dpd that 
be, i e 3 -
an d log i e o r cur rev t 1 aw for this C our t J 
give its sanction to the perpetuation or 
such conf us i on. C on s eq uen t ly , we overrule 
the decision in McGinn , and hold that if 
requested, a trial court muse inform the 
jury of the effect of apportioning to the 
plaintiff 507o or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparative negligence case,'if 
the effect of such an instruction will not 
be to confuse or mislead ^ ° ;v.rv. 
Dixon, supra, at 31 
In • - ii j J '" apparently lie It 
Dixon had no -carina , :i deciding wnet --er Mr, Linswall was 
9 
en t i t l ed to a new t r i a l . Presumably this was so because 
Dixon had been decided after judgment had been entered by 
the Tr ia l Court, a lbei t while p l a i n t i f f ' s motion was pending, 
and had not been Utah law at the time of t r i a l . In refusing 
to give Dixon limited retroactive effect, p l a i n t i f f ' s motions 
were denied. 
Pla int i f f now appeals to this Court to decide 
whether the Distr ict Court erred in i t s discretion not to 
apply the Dixon holding and denying p l a i n t i f f ' s motion for a 
new trial. Appellant requests this Court to grant limited 
retroactivity to Dixon v. Stewart and to remand this case to 
the District Court to be decided in accordance with the law 
announced in that decision. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE EFFECT 
OF THEIR FINDING OF COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE. 
It is appellant's position that had not Dixon v. 
Stewart, supra, been decided this case would have prompted 
the overruling of McGinn v. Utah Power and Light Co., supra. 
In both this case and Dixon, the confusion experienced by the 
jury led to an equally severe prejudicial effect on the 
plaintiff. Factually, the dilemma faced by the two juries 
is almost indistinguishable. The major difference between 
Dixon and the case at bar is that here defendants, in the 
lower court, brought a third-party claim for contribution. 
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^o*-' "^ +~^ new L"* . ., . i_. ,^. 
., ;. . ^ arprueu L,:ai i .: nave m s t r u e * e d " e 
^ i ty a c c : r d i n ^ ; t** "ho r - i le announced : ^ e^ 
n e c e s s a r i ? - " - .-"-• , „ : . i w ^ ^..ci cu* i i s r ^ M c t i o n 
-r- A/Ouia i.x,f .-tit.' . . nformed or -defendant - *i,* r c o u r t 
s e t t lenient w i t h A n n e t t e Rel^on a« / • "nT-
a r g u e d t h a t t r o . . t h i s knowledge t h e i r v 
vwux ; i« i n t e r r e d an a d m i s s i o n >" ^ e g l i ^ e ^ c c 
p a r t a n 1 De rhaps b a s e d , 111 -•;»*:; t - ...r.L**i ^ ^amages <-••.• 
t h e dc~ . . . f i g u r e in t h e out of ^ , ±: s e t t l e m e n t . 
A p p e l l a n t d i s a g r e e s w i t h 
f o 11 owin,!1 t e a s o n s . 
At a IPi r i i tiiJin. 3 Dixon i•" ^ *" - i ^  *•: ^n i f i- -• *, 
w ^ i i d b a w :^f",»-~, • s e q u e n c e r r e n d i n g 
t « : i a i i : _ : ; ^ , . u rt n e g l i g e n t . Dixon, s u p r ^ a" ^ 
In - ^ ; ~ " . s r r i r t i o n *-~r> ; — • v" ' 
p i '" . , , L - . i t : ; j . . a r i r n a r i l v n e g l i g e n t . 
A p p e l l a n t does n o t d i s p u r e f ; •/ a n f a i r ^ e s - ' d e f e n 'ar * ' ~ 2 
j u r y been .
 r^*-~<.:** ^ ., ,_ _ .-u. . d . v. 
v , . ' ; , . , i ' . n r : : : , .uLndLe be lder * a - - e *. l^im of c o n t r i b u -
t i o n a g a i n s t t-.^e p l a i n t i f f at a ^ n e ' l a n t ' s p * v ' 
f ^ u r t COL : ", iat w o u t , iidvt </t-
l d i r ^o b j d f L i e - om **"'*• w^ * : \ ive a l l o w e d f'ne x r u 
r e a c " i v^v* :i *f~ wiuu knowu- v J P J r* ^n- . 
_ _ t-v GO ^ e r Dixoti , bu t s t o p p i n g snor1" cl e x p o s i n g 
defendant's pre-trial settlement and cross-claim. 
Such an instruction would have remedied the jury's 
confusion, as discussed in Dixon. It would have allowed the 
jury to accurately apportion liability and resulting damages 
in relation to their specific finding of facts. A determination 
of the existence or the amount of defendant's counter-claim 
for contribution, based on such a verdict, would then become 
a simple matter of accounting. See e.g., Dessaur v. Memorial 
General Hospital, 628 P.2d 337 (N.M. 1981). 
It seems evident that there is as clear a need in 
this case for additional instruction as that found in Dixon. 
Here it would appear that not only was the jury 
confused as to what they were being asked to decide, in terms 
of liability, but apparently tried to arrive at an estimate 
of plaintiff's damages by computing an amount reduced by the 
percent of his negligence. Such an anomalous result was 
found intolerable to the court in Dixon and should be recog-
nized as such in this case. 
II. DIXON v. STEWART SHOULD BE 
RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO THIS CASE 
WHICH WAS PENDING WHEN DLKON WAS 
DECIDED. 
In Loyal Order of Moose No, 259 v. County Bd., 
657 P.2d 257,264 (Utah 1982), this Court recognized the 
various retroactive applications given to judicial decisions: 
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"The a p p l i c a t i o n may he t > p a r t i e s 
ana r a c t s of t h e c a s e where t h e new 
r u l e i s announced, t o pending c a s e s , t o 
f u t u r e i n i t i a t e d c a s e s a r i s i n g from 
e a r l i e r e v e n t s , o r in some r~are I n s t a n c e s , 
t o t e r m i n a t e d c a s e s whIch a r e s u b j e c t t o 
c o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k * Emr-1. **- i '- ; / >. M 
• - , *^ j " . / v t ; e ; i > / : i - r. r e a ' e d as a f u n c t i o n 
of j u d i c i a l Ti--^ ' s^ ' a r ' i ' l e ' i » * bp d i ^ c r e ^ 1 ! ^ of t h e 
~ - ^ V C I JL '-^ • Lourt .*o v a JL '^i _.c ~ CJ i ^ J C ^ C i.*w ^^ 
Tr ;
- p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n t h a t b e c a u s e h i - c a s e 
. 1 n^r ^~sf r i n a " : w d e o i d e o - - ; as r< "ici: . .AJLI 
I > * ... . . o i . i r o i t h e .^- r-. e Tr 
Utah, CJI a c t i o n : p e n d i n g n t i l f i n i l i e t e r m i n a t i o n un a p p e a l 
• -
r
 u n H * f~ ^  r *-"; ~v : . Young e t . u x . v , Hansen 
** i n t e r e - t ^ ^ r f ; n a l 4 + i • » 
r--j r ^ . . . . . ; . . . . , . . e n e f i t of d s u b s e q u e n t 
change i n m e law, See Andrews v . MorrXs , 669 p . 2 d 8 1 , 95 
(Utah 1 9 8 3 ) , 
i i p p e i . d ; , , s strive t h a t i"ht ~. u-f ~u<* b a l a n c e * -e 
n e e d t o ^ODJ ,T a d e c i s i o n ^et- "oact^^p"' ; > ^ ~ 
whe*-"*7- ^ • - o . * _c i.Lcu anon .-. ,;: - r e 
r e t r o a o t i ' . f 'Uerai .->u c r e a r e s a bu rden S t a t e Far^n Mutua 1 
I n s u r a n c e Company Farmers l u s u r a : : ^ . *. : IhfS, V n 
F * - • . - ' . • .. . hou^h r e s p o n d e n t ":av nave 
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Dixon decision on appeal would unfairly allow respondent the 
advantage of having the entire case decided on law that has 
since been overruled. This result would seem to offend the 
concept of fairness and create the greater injustice. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT1S 
EXTRA-MARITAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
ANNETTE BELDEN. 
Appellant's last claim of error is based on the 
Trial Court's permission allowing defendant's counsel to 
cross-examine Mr, Lingwall about his involvement with Annette 
Belden. 
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence, effective at time 
of trial, provides in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided, 
the judge may in his discretion 
exclude evidence if he finds that 
its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk that its 
admission will, . .. (b) create a sub-
stantial danger of undue prejudice 
or of confusing the issues or of 
misleading the jury. 
It is appellant's position that evidence before the 
jury showing appellant's extra-marital affair with Annette 
Belden was infinitely more prejudicial than whatever probative-
ness it might have had in determining what Mr. Lingwall's 
state of mind was up until the time of the accident. 
On cross examination, and over the objection of 
- 14 -
appellant's coimsel, the follox^ ing testimony was heard by 
the jury! (Tr.Vol.I, p. 183, In. 5) 
Q. Did you get sufficient sieep the night before 
so you were alert and knew what you werje doing as you were 
driving just prior to the accident? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. You w e r e n ' t t h i n k i n g of aJny of the consequences 
of be ing wi th Annet te Belden as you wei^e d r i v i n g down t h a t 
road , then? 
A. No, s i r . 
Q. You w e r e n ' t concerned abojut what your wife might 
t h i n k about . . . 
(Objec t ion and d i s c u s s i o n ) 
THE COURT: You may proceed as f a r as any f u r t h e r 
founda t ion . 
Q. (By Mr. Heath) You were mar r i ed a t t h a t t ime , 
were you not? 
A. I s t i l l am. 
Q. My question to you, were you married to the 
woman you are married to now at the tim£? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Did you ask your wife if you could take Annette 
to Cowboy Days? 
A. No, I didn't. 
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Q. Did she know Annette was with you? 
A. No, my wife was in Los Angeles. 
Q. Did you consider the fact that you would be 
telling her that you had Annette with you up in Evanston 
and then Elk hunting? 
A. If she would have asked me, I would have told 
her. I didn't keep any secrets, 
Q. She wouldn't have objected to that? 
A. I can't answer that question. 
Q. I see. 
A. She may have objected, yes. 
Q. I think the question really is, were you feeling 
at all guilty about being out there without your wife and 
being with another woman? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As you were driving down? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That wasn ' t on your mind? 
A, No, s i r . 
Q. It didn't divert your attention? 
A. No, sir. 
Admitting evidence of a p p e l l a n t ' s ex t r a -mar i t a l 
a f f a i r before a jury tha t was overwhelmingly Mormon and 
conservative not only prejudiced appel lant by depict ing him 
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as morally dishonest, but also allowed the jury to determine 
liability based on appellant's ethical conduct rather than 
on whether he had acted negligently at the time of the accident. 
It is true that, in matters qf determining materiality 
the trial court should be accorded a l^rge measure of discretion.-
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2ld 1139 (Utah 1977), but 
where this discretion has been abused tfre Trial Court may be 
reversed. Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 
314 (Utah 19 79), 
The factual issues to be deci'ded by the jury at trial 
were extremely close. The accident between appellant's motor-
cycle and respondent's Mack Truck took jplace in the middle of 
a one lane dirt road. And, because thip road connected with 
a public highway and traversed various private properties, 
there was some question as to whether the accident had taken 
place on a public or private road. The public-private finding 
determined whether Utah's, then constitutional, Automobile 
Guest Statute was applicable, and if so|, whether appellant was 
liable on respondent's cross-claim for Contribution. 
Under these circumstances, th«p lower court should 
have been more cautious in admitting testimony dealing with 
appellant's relationship with Annette Balden. In the minds 
of many jurors it would have inevitably created an inference 
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and in some cases a presumption of wrongdoing on the part of 
those involved. Once implanted, the taint cannot help but 
affect a jury's decision making process and where the factual 
issues are narrow, the inference may mean the difference. 
Here, the Court abused its discretion in failing 
to avoid the tendency of the proffered evidence to mislead 
and prejudice the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementioned claims of error, 
appellant petitions this Court to reverse the District Court's 
denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial and to remand 
this ca3e for new trial to be conducted in accordance with 
the opinion of this Court. Ql^L 
DATED this / p ''day of December, 1984. 
R e s p e c t f u l l y submi t t ed , 
ISEN 
At to rney f o r Appe l l an t 
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AFFIDAVIT OF KENT NI|CHOLS 
KENT NICHOLS, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That affiant was a member &nd foreman of a jury 
impaneled in the litigation of Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., et al., 
Civil No. 6749, commenced November 30, 1982, before the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Summit County, State of Utah. 
2. That during its deliberations, said jury became 
confused due to the nature of the special[ verdict and regarding 
the effect their finding of contributory [negligence would have 
on the parties, Martin Lingwall and DalbcL Inc. 
3. That affiant in his representative capacity as 
foreman of the jury requested additional instruction from the 
Court in a desire to eliminate the confustLon. 
4. That the Court refused the Request and, instead, 
referred the jury to instructions already given. 
5. That said jury returned a special verdict estab-
lishing plaintiff Lingwall 70% negligent ^nd defendant Dalbo, 
Inc., 307o negligent. In addition, plaintiff Lingwall was 
found to have suffered $69,083.00 in damages from the accident. 
APPENDIX A-l 
6. That the aforementioned verdict did not result 
in the effect desired by the jury, namely, that the plaintiff 
Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall 
to recover some damages in compensation for his injuries. 
DATED this '/& day of December, 1984. 
S' 
:SS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
December, 1984. 
$P 
day of 
My commission expires: 
NOTARY] 
Residi: 
PUBLIC 
ig a t Ba i t Lake County, UT 
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AFFIDAVIT OF ORDELL STEPHENS 
ORDELL STEPHENS, being first c}uly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That affiant was a member pf a jury impaneled 
in the litigation of Belden v. Dalbo, Injc. , et al. , Civil No. 
6749, commenced November 30, 1982, before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, in the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, 
State of Utah. 
2. That during its deliberations, said jury became 
confused due to the nature of the special verdict and regarding 
the effect their finding of contributory negligency would have 
on the parties, Martin Lingwall and Dalbcfr, Inc. 
3. That affiant in his representative capacity as 
a juror requested additional instruction from the Court in a 
desire to eliminate the confusion. 
4. That the Court refused the request and, instead, 
referred the jury to instructions already! given. 
5. That said jury returned a slpecial verdict estab-
lishing plaintiff Lingwall 70% negligent and defendant Dalbo, 
Inc. , 307o negligent. In addition, plainqiff Lingwall was 
found to have suffered $69,083.00 in damajges from the accident. 
APPENDIX A-2 
6. That the aforementioned verdict did not result 
in the effect desired by the jury, namely, that the plaintiff 
Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall 
to recover some damages in compensation for his injuries. 
DATED this \ 0 day of December, 1984. 
// 
s/^ • 
ORDELL STEPHENS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
of December, 1984. 
w 
uZ day 
o 
) ; (--:• 
My commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~' 
Residing atj Salt Lake County, UT 
i 
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AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN HpYT 
KEVIN HOYT, being first duly syorn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That affiant was a member 0f a jury impaneled 
in the litigation of Belden v. Dalbo, Inp., et al. , Civil No. 
6749, commenced November 30, 1982, befor^ the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Summit County, State of Utah. 
2. That during its deliberations, said jury became 
confused due to the nature of the special verdict and regarding 
the effect their finding of contributory negligence would have 
on the parties, Martin Lingwall and Dalbc}, Inc. 
3. That affiant in his representative capacity as 
a juror requested additional instruction from the Court in a 
desire to eliminate the confusion. 
4. That the Court refused the request and, instead, 
referred the jury to instructions already^  given. 
5. That said jury returned a sbecial verdict estab-
lishing plaintiff Lingwall 70% negligent land defendant Dalbo, 
Inc. , 307o negligent. In addition, plaintiff Lingwall was 
found to have suffered $69,083.00 in damages from the accident. 
APPENDIX A-3 
6. That the aforementioned verdict did not result 
in the effect desired by the jury, namely, that the plaintiff 
Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall 
to recover some damages in compensation |for his injuries. 
DATED this /0 day of December, 1984. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
December, 1984. 
My commission expires 
L-U-&S 
IcJlday OJ 
muL 
a t S a l t Lake County, UT 
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AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, being f i r s t duly sworn deposes and states as 
follows: 
1 . That the aff iant is an attorney for the f i rm of Nielsen & Senior, 
Salt Lake C i ty , Utah. 
2. That af f iant , as counsel, represented the p la int i f f , Martin R. 
Lingwal l , in the l i t igat ion, Beldon v. Dalbo, Inc. et al., heard November 30, 
1982, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, and a j u r y , in the Th i rd 
Judicial Distr ic t Court of Summit County, State of Utah. 
3. That dur ing its del iberations, the j u r y became confused 
regarding the effect the i r f ind ing of comparative negligence would have on the 
part ies. 
4 . That the j u r y requested additional instruct ion to eliminate said 
confusion. 
5. That the court denied said request and instead referred the j u r y 
to the instructions already g iven. 
6. That the aforementioned, though not recorded by the cour t , was 
witnessed by affiant and other members of the bench and cour t . 
APPENDIX A-4 
f DATED this y day of December, 1984. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this £j day of December, 
19S4. . 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in XjqJ/f~ (ftik.L 
My Commission Expires: 
MI &f fir* 
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